We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games.
Introduction
There is a wide range of economic contexts in which "aggregate costs" have to be allocated amongst individual agents or components who derive the bene…ts from a common project. A …rm has to allocate overhead costs amongst its di¤erent divisions. Regulatory authorities have to set taxes or fees on individual users for a variety of services. Partners in a joint venture must share costs (and bene…ts) of the joint venture. In many of these examples, there is no external force such as the market, which determines the allocation of costs. Thus, the …nal allocation of costs is decided either by mutual agreement or by an "arbitrator" on the basis of some notion of fairness.
A central problem of cooperative game theory is how to divide the bene…ts of cooperation amongst individual players or agents. Since there is an obvious analogy between the division of costs and that of bene…ts, the tools of cooperative game theory have proved very useful in the analysis of cost allocation problems. 1 Much of this literature has focused on "general" cost allocation problems, so that the ensuing cost game is identical to that of a typical game in characteristic function form. This has facilitated the search for "appropriate" cost allocation rules considerably given the corresponding results in cooperative game theory.
The purpose of this paper is the analysis of allocation rules in a special class of cost allocation problems. The common feature of these problems is that a group of users have to be connected to a single supplier of some service. For instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant, and hence have to share the cost of the distribution network. There is a non-negative cost of connecting each pair of users (towns) as well as a cost of connecting each user (town) to the common supplier (power plant). A cost game arises because cooperation reduces aggregate costs -it may be cheaper for town A to construct a link to town B which is "nearer" to the power plant, rather than build a separate link to the plant. Clearly, an e¢ cient network must be a tree, which connects all users to the common supplier. That is 1 Moulin [11] and Young [16] are excellent surveys of this literature. why these games have been labelled minimum cost spanning tree games.
Notice that in the example mentioned above, it makes sense for town B to demand some compensation from A in order to let A use its own link to the power plant.
But, how much should A agree to pay? This is where both strategic issues as well as considerations of fairness come into play. Of course, these issues are present in any surplus-sharing or cost allocation problem. What is special in our context is that the structure of the problem implies that the domain of the allocation rule will be smaller than that in a more general cost problem. This smaller domain raises the possibility of constructing allocation rules satisfying "nice" properties which cannot always be done in general problems. For instance, it is known that the core of a minimum cost spanning tree game is always non-empty. 2 Much of the literature on minimum cost spanning tree games has focused on algorithmic issues. 3 In contrast, the derivation of attractive cost allocation rules or the analysis of axiomatic properties of di¤erent rules has received correspondingly little attention. 4 This provides the main motivation for this paper. We show that the allocation rule proposed by Bird [1] , which always selects an allocation in the core of the game, does not satisfy cost monotonicity. Cost monotonicity is an extremely attractive property, and requires that the cost allocated to agent i does not increase if the cost of a link involving i goes down, nothing else changing. Notice that if a rule does not satisfy cost monotonicity, then it may not provide agents with the appropriate incentives to reduce the costs of constructing links.
The cost allocation rule, which coincides with the Shapley value of the cost game, satis…es cost monotonicity. However, the Shapley value is unlikely to be used in these contexts because it may not lie in the core. This implies that some group of agents may well …nd it bene…cial to construct their own network if the Shapley value is used to allocate costs. We show that cost monotonicity and the core are not mutually exclusive 5 by constructing a new rule, which satis…es cost monotonicity and also selects an allocation in the core of the game.
We then go on to provide axiomatic characterizations of the Bird rule as well as the new rule constructed by us. An important type of axiom used by us is closely linked to the reduced game properties which have been extensively used in the axiomatic characterization of solutions in cooperative game theory. 6 These are consistency conditions, which place restrictions on how solutions of di¤erent but related games de…ned on di¤erent player sets behave. We show that the Bird rule and the new allocation rule satisfy di¤erent consistency conditions. The plan of this paper is the following. In section 2, we de…ne the basic structure of minimum cost spanning tree games. The main purpose of Section 3 is the construction of the new rule as well as the proof that it satis…es cost monotonicity and core selection. Section 4 contains the characterization results. An appendix contains the proofs of some lemmas.
The Framework
Let N = f1; 2; : : :g be the set of all possible agents. We are interested in graphs or networks where the nodes are elements of a set N [ f0g, where N N , and 0 is a distinguished node which we will refer to as the source or root . A typical graph will be denoted g N .
Henceforth, for any set N N , we will use N + to denote the set N [ f0g.
Two nodes i and j 2 N + are said to be connected in graph g N if 9(i 1 i 2 ); (i 2 i 3 );
The set of connected graphs over N + is denoted by N :
Consider any N N , where #N = n. A cost matrix C = (c ij ) represents the cost of direct connection beween any pair of nodes. That is, c ij is the cost of directly transferable utility games, there is no solution concept which picks an allocation in the core of the game when the latter is nonempty and also satis…es a property which is analogous to cost monotonicity. 6 See Peleg [12] , Thomson [15] .
connecting any pair i; j 2 N + . We assume that each c ij > 0 whenever i 6 = j. We also adopt the convention that for each i 2 N + , c ii = 0. So, each cost matrix over N + is nonnegative, symmetric and of order n + 1. In this paper we will often use the term matrix instead of cost matrix. The set of all matrices for N is denoted by C N . However, we will typically drop the subscript N whenever there is no cause for confusion about the set of nodes.
Consider any C 2 C N . A minimum cost spanning tree (m.c.s.t.) over N + satis…es
c ij : Note that an m.c.s.t. need not be unique. Clearly a minimum cost spanning network must be a tree. Otherwise, we can delete an extra edge and still obtain a connected graph at a lower cost.
An m.c.s.t. corresponding to C 2 C N will typically be denoted by g N (C).
Example 1: Consider a set of three rural communities fA; B; Cg, which have to decide whether to build a system of irrigation channels to an existing dam, which is the source. Each community has to be connected to the dam in order to draw water from the dam. However, some connection(s) could be indirect. For instance, community A could be connected directly to the dam, while B and C are connected to A, and hence indirectly to the source.
There is a cost of building a channel connecting each pair of communities, as well as a channel connecting each community directly to the dam. Suppose, these costs are represented by the matrix C given below. 
The minimum cost of building the system of irrigation channels will be 4 units.
Our object of interest in this paper is to see how the total cost of 4 units is to be distributed amongst A; B and C.
This provides the motivation for the next de…nition.
De…nition 1:
A cost allocation rule (or simply a rule) is a family of functions
We will drop the superscript N for the rest of the paper.
So, given any set of nodes N and any matrix C of order (jN j + 1), a rule speci…es the costs attributed to agents in N . Note that the source 0 is not an active player, and hence does not bear any part of the cost.
A rule can be generated by any single-valued game-theoretic solution of a transferable utility game. Thus, consider the transferable utility game generated by considering the aggregate cost of a minimum cost spanning tree for each coalition S N .
Given C and S N , let C S be the matrix restricted to S + . Then, consider a m.c.s.t.
g S (C S ) over S + , and the corresponding minimum cost of connecting S to the source. One particularly important game-theoretic property, which will be used subsequently is that of the core. If a rule does not always pick an element in the core of the game, then some subset of N will …nd it pro…table to break up N and construct its own minimum cost tree. This motivates the following de…nition. However, cost allocation rules can also be de…ned without appealing to the underlying cost game. For instance, this was the procedure followed by Bird [1] . In order to describe his procedure, we need some more notation.
The (unique) path from i to j in tree g, is a set U (i; j; g) = fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i K g, where each pair (i k 1 i k ) 2 g, and i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i K are all distinct agents with i 1 = i; i K = j. The predecessor set of an agent i in g is de…ned as P (i; g) = fkjk 6 = i; k 2 7 See Kar [10] for an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value in m.c.s.t. games. U (0; i; g)g: The immediate predecessor of agent i, denoted by (i), is the agent who comes immediately before i, that is, (i) 2 P (i; g) and k 2 P (i; g) implies either k = (i) or k 2 P ( (i); g). 8 The followers of agent i, are those agents who come immediately after i; F (i) = fjj (j) = ig.
Bird's method is de…ned with respect to a speci…c tree. Let g N be some m.c.s.t.
corresponding to the matrix C. Then,
So, in the Bird allocation, each node pays the cost of connecting to its immediate predecessor in the appropriate m.c.s.t.
Notice that this does not de…ne a rule if C gives rise to more than one m.c.s.t.
However, when C does not induce a unique m.c.s.t., one can still use Bird's method on each m.c.s.t. derived from C and then take some convex combination of the allocations corresponding to each m.c.s.t. as the rule. In general, the properties of the resulting rule will not be identical to those of the rule given by Bird's method on matrices which induce unique m.c.s.t. s.
In section 4, we will use two domain restrictions on the set of permissible matrices.
These are de…ned below. Notice if C is not in C 2 , then even a "small" perturbation of C produces a matrix with the property that no two edges have the same cost. Of course, such a matrix must be in C 2 . So, even the stronger domain restriction is relatively mild, and the permissible sets of matrices are large.
Cost Monotonicity
The Bird allocation is an attractive rule because it is a core selection. In addition, it is easy to compute. However, it fails to satisfy cost monotonicity. 8 Note that since g is a tree, the immediate predecessor must be unique. m (C 0 ). Cost monotonicity is an extremely appealing property. The property applies to two matrices which di¤er only in the cost of connecting the pair (ij), c 0 ij being lower than c ij . Then, cost monotonicity requires that no agent in the pair fi; jg be charged more when the matrix changes from C to C 0 .
Despite its intuitive appeal, cost monotonicity has a lot of bite. 9 The following example shows that the Bird rule does not satisfy cost monotonicity. The rule corresponding to the Shapley value of the cost game does satisfy cost monotonicity. However, it does not always select an outcome which is in the core of the cost game. Our main purpose in this section is to de…ne a new rule which will be a core selection and satisfy cost monotonicity. We are able to do this despite the impossibility result due to Young because of the special structure of minimum cost spanning tree games -these are a strict subset of the class of balanced games.
Hence, monotonicity in the context of m.c.s.t. games is a weaker restriction.
We describe an algorithm whose outcome will be the cost allocation prescribed by the new rule. Our rule is de…ned for all matrices in C. However, in order to economise on notation, we describe the algorithm for a matrix in C 2 . We then indicate how to construct the rule for all matrices. 9 In fact, Young [16] shows that an analogous property in the context of TU games cannot be satis…ed by any solution which selects a core outcome in balanced games.
Fix some N N , and choose some matrix C 2 C 2 N . Also, for any A N , de…ne A c as the complement of A in N + . That is A c = N + n A.
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
Let A 0 = f0g, g 0 = ;, t 0 = 0.
Step 1 : Choose the ordered pair (
Step k : De…ne the ordered pair
The algorithm terminates at step #N = n. Then,
The new rule is described by equations (1), (2) .
At any step k, A k 1 is the set of nodes which have already been connected to the source 0. Then, a new edge is constructed at this step by choosing the lowest-cost edge between a node in A k 1 and nodes in A k 1 c . The cost allocation of b k 1 is decided at step k. Equation (1) shows that b k 1 pays the minimum of t k 1 , which is the maximum cost amongst all edges which have been constructed in previous steps, and c a k b k , the edge being constructed in step k. Finally, equation (2) shows that b n , the last node to be connected, pays the maximum cost. 10 Remark 1: The algorithm has been described for matrices in C 2 . Suppose that C 6 2 C 2 . Then, the algorithm is not well-de…ned because at some step k, two distinct edges (a k b k ) and ( a k b k ) may minimise the cost of connecting nodes in A k 1 and
. But, there is an easy way to extend the algorithm to deal with matrices not in C 2 . Let be a strict ordering over N . Then, can be used as a tie-breaking rule -for
Any such tie-breaking rule makes the algorithm well-de…ned. Now, let be the set of all strict orderings 1 0 From Prim [13] , it follows that g n is also the m.c.s.t. corresponding to C.
over N . Then, the eventual cost allocation is obtained by taking the simple average of the "component" cost allocations obtained for each ordering 2 . That is, for any 2 , let (C) denote the cost allocation obtained from the algorithm when is used as the tie-breaking rule. Then,
We illustrate this procedure in Example 5 below.
Remark 2: Notice that only depends on the m.c.s.t.s corresponding to any matrix. This property of Tree Invariance adds to the computational simplicity of the rule, and distinguishes it from rules such as the Shapley Value and nucleolus.
We now construct a few examples to illustrate the algorithm.
Example 3: Suppose C 1 is such that the m.c.s.t. is unique and is a line. That is, each node has at most one follower. Then the nodes can be labelled a 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n , where a 0 = 0; #N = n, with the predecessor set of a k , P (a k ; g) = f0; a 1 ; : : : ; a k 1 g.
Then,
and
Example 4: Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and 
There is only one m.c.s.t. of C 2 .
Step 1 : We have (a 1 b 1 ) = (01), t 1 = c 01 = 4; A 1 = f0; 1g:
Step 2 : Next, (a 2 b 2 ) = (13), 1 (C 2 ) = min(t 1 ; c 13 ) = 1, t 2 = max(t 1 ; c 13 ) = 4, A 2 = f0; 1; 3g.
Step 3 : We now have (a 3 b 3 ) = (12), 3 (C 2 ) = min(t 2 ; c 12 ) = 2, t 3 = max(t 2 ; c 12 ) = 4, A 3 = f0; 1; 2; 3g:
Step 4 : Next, (a 4 b 4 ) = (34), 2 (C 2 ) = min(t 3 ; c 34 ) = 3, t 4 = max(t 3 ; c 34 ) = 4, A 4 = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g.
, and the algorithm is terminated.
So, (C 2 ) = (1; 3; 2; 4). This example shows that it is not necessary for a node to be assigned the cost of its preceding or following edge. Here 2 pays the cost of the edge (34), while 3 pays the cost of the edge (12).
The next example involves a matrix which has more than one m.c.s.t. with edges which cost the same.
Example 5: Let N = f1; 2; 3g, and Suppose the algorithm is …rst applied to g N . Then, we have b 1 = 1. In step 2, a 2 = 1, but b 2 can be either 2 or 3. Taking each in turn, we get the vectors x 1 = (2; 2; 4) and x 2 = (2; 4; 2). Now, consider g 1 N , which is a line. So, as we have described in Example 3, the resulting cost allocation is b x = (2; 2; 4).
The algorithm will "generate" g 1 N instead of g N for all 2 which ranks 2 over 1. Hence, the "weight" attached to g 1 N is half. Similarly, the weight attached to x 1 and x 2 must be one-sixth and one-third respectively.
Hence, (C 3 ) = (2; We now show that is a core selection and also satis…es Cost Monotonicity.
Theorem 1:
The rule satis…es Cost Monotonicity and is a core selection.
Proof : We …rst show that satis…es Cost Monotonicity.
Fix any N N . We give our proof for matrices in C 2 , and then indicate how the proof can be extended to cover all matrices. Let C; C 2 C 2 be such that for some i; j 2 N + , c ij > c ij , and c kl = c kl for all other pairs (kl). We need to show that
In describing the algorithm which is used in constructing , we …xed a speci…c matrix, and so did not have to specify the dependence of A k ; t k ; a k ; b k etc. on the matrix. But, now we need to distinguish between these entities for the two matrices C and C. We adopt the following notation in the rest of the proof of the thorem. Let
refer to the matrix C, while A k ; t k ; a k ; b k ; g N etc. will denote the entities corresponding to C.
Without loss of generality, let i be the immediate predecessor of j in g N . Since the source never pays anything, we only consider the case where i is not the source.
Suppose i = b k 1 . As the cost of all other edges remain the same,
and that A m A l , and t l t m .
Case 2(b): Suppose a l+1 6 2 A m . Then, a l+1 6 = j. Also, a l+1 2 A l , and so
We need to consider two sub-cases.
Hence, satis…es cost monotonicity. 11 We now show that for all C 2 C, (C) is an element in the core of the cost game corresponding to C.
Again, we present the proof for any C 2 C 2 in order to avoid notational complications. 12 We want to show that for all S N , X i2S i (C) c(S).
Without loss of generality, assume that for all i 2 N; b i = i and denote c a k b k = c k .
Claim 1: If S = f1; 2; : : : Kg where K #N , then
Proof of Claim:
Also, g is in fact the m.c.s.t. over S.
Hence, a blocking coalition cannot consist of an initial set of integers, given our assumption that b k = k for all k 2 N .
1 1 Suppose C 6 2 C 2 . What we have shown above is that the outcome of the algorithm for each tie-breaking rule satis…es cost monotonicity. Hence, the average must also satisfy cost monotonicity. 1 2 Suppose instead that C 6 2 C 2 . Then, our subsequent proof shows that the outcome of the algorithm is in the core for each 2 . Since the core is a convex set, the average (that is, ) must be in the core if each is in the core. Now, let S be a largest blocking coalition. That is,
There are two possible cases.
Case 1: 1 6 2 S.
Let K = min j2S j. Consider T = f1; : : : ; K 1g. We will show that S [ T is also a blocking coalition, contradicting the description of S.
where (0s) 2 g S , the m.c.s.t. of S. Note that the last inequality follows from the fact that c k c 0s for all k 2 f1; : : : Kg.
, establishing the contradiction that S [ T is a blocking coalition.
From the claim, S is not an initial segment of the integers. So, we can partition S into fS 1 ; : : : ; S K g, where each S k consists of consecutive integers, and i 2 S k ; j 2 S k+1 imply that i + 1 < j. Assume m = max j2S 1 j and n = min j2S 2 j. Note that n > m + 1. De…ne T = fm + 1; : : : ; n 1g. We will show that S [ T is a blocking coalition, contradicting the assumption that S is a largest blocking coalition.
Since g S is a connected graph over S + , there is s 2 2 S n S 1 and
So, S [ T is a blocking coalition, establishing the desired contradiction.
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Characterization Theorems
In this section, we present characterizations of the allocation rules and B. 13 These characterization theorems will be proved for the restricted domains C 1 for B and C 2 for . Examples 8 and 9 explain why we choose these domain restrictions.
We …rst describe the axioms used in the characterization.
E¢ ciency (EF):
This axiom ensures that the agents together pay exactly the cost of the e¢ cient network.
Before moving on to our next axiom, we introduce the concept of an extreme point.
Let C 2 C N be such that the m.c.s.t. g N (C) is unique. Then, i 2 N is called an extreme point of g N (C) (or equivalently of C), if i has no follower in g N (C).
Extreme Point Monotonicity (EPM): Let C 2 C 1 N , and i be an extreme point of C. Let C be the restriction of C over the set N + n fig. A 
Suppose i is an extreme point of g N (C). Note that i is of no use to the rest of the network since no node is connected to the source through i. Extreme Point Monotonicity essentially states that no "existing" node k will agree to pay a higher cost in order to include i in the network.
The next two axioms are consistency properties, analogous to reduced game properties introduced by Davis and Maschler [2] and Hart and Mas-Colell [9] . 14 Consider any C with a unique m.c.s.t. g N (C), and suppose that (i0) 2 g N (C).
Let x i be the cost allocation 'assigned' to i. Suppose i 'leaves' the scene (or stops bargaining for a di¤erent cost allocation), but other nodes are allowed to connect through it. Then, the e¤ective reduced matrix changes for the remaining nodes. We can think of two alternative ways in which the others can use node i.
(i) The others can use node i only to connect to the source.
(ii) Node i can be used more widely. That is, node j can connect to node k through i.
In case (i), the connection costs on N + n fig are described by the following equations:
For all j 6 = i; c j0 = min(c j0 ; c ji + c i0 x i )
If fj; kg \ fi; 0g = ;; then c jk = c jk 
Equation 9 captures the notion that j can use i to connect to any other node k,
where k is not necessarily the source.
Let C tr x i represent the reduced matrix derived through equation 9. We can now de…ne the two consistency conditions. Source Consistency (SR): Let C 2 C 1 N , and (0i) 2 g N (C). Then, the rule satis…es
Tree Consistency (TR): Let C 2 C 2 N , and (0i) 2 g N (C). Then, the rule satis…es
The two consistency conditions require that the cost allocated to any agent be the same on the original and reduced matrix. This ensures that once an agent connected to the source agrees to a particular cost allocation and then subsequently allows other agents to use its location for possible connections, the remaining agents do not have any incentive to reopen the debate about what is an appropriate allocation of costs.
The following lemmas will be used in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. The proofs of these lemmas are given in the appendix.
Lemma 1 : Let C 2 C 1 N , and i 2 N . If c ik = min
Lemma 2 : Let C 2 C 2 N ; and (01) 2 g N (C). Let 1 (C) = min k2N + nf1g c 1k : Then,
Lemma 4: Suppose satis…es TR, EPM and EF. Let C 2 C 2 N . If (i0) 2 g N (C), then i (C) min k2N + nfig c ik .
Lemma 5: Suppose satis…es SR, EPM and EF. Let
We now present a characterization of in terms of Tree Consistency, E¢ ciency and Extreme Point Monotonicity.
Theorem 2 : Over the domain C 2 , a rule satis…es TR, EF and EPM if and only if = .
Proof : First, we prove that satis…es all the three axioms.
Let C 2 C 2 .
E¢ ciency follows trivially from the algorithm which de…nes the allocation.
Next, we show that satis…es TR.
Let (10) = argmin k2N c k0 . Hence, the algorithm yields b 1 = 1, and 1 (C) = min(c 10 ; c a 2 b 2 ). There are two possible choice of a 2 .
Case 1 : a 2 = 1. Then, we get c 1b 2 = min k2N nf1g c 1k . Therefore 1 (C) = min(c 10 ; c 1b 2 ) = min k2N + nf1g c 1k .
Case 2 : a 2 = 0. Then, c b 2 0 c 1k 8k 2 N n f1g. Since c 10 c b 2 0 , we conclude Let 1 (C) = x 1 = min k2N + nf1g c 1k = c 1k . Denoting C tr x 1 by C, we know from Lemma 2, that C 2 C 2 . Hence, the algorithm is well de…ned on C.
Let a k ; b k ; t k , etc denote the relevant variables of the algorithm corresponding to C.
Claim: 8i 2 N n f1g, i (C) = i ( C). That is, satis…es Tree Consistency.
Proof of Claim:
From the proof of lemma 2,
Also,
In either case, c 0i < c 0j for j 6 2 f0; 1; ig.
Also, a 3 2 f0; 1; ig, while b 3 2 f0; 1; ig c . If a 3 2 f0; ig, then a 2 = a 3 . If a 3 = 1,
The claim is established for fb 3 ; : : : ; b n g by using the strucure of g N nf1g ( C), the de…nition of C given above, and the following induction hypothesis. The details are left to the reader.
For all i = 2; : : : ; k 1,
We now have to show that satis…es EPM.
Let i 2 N be an extreme point of g N (C), and b C be the restriction of C over
In order to di¤erentiate between the algorithms on C and b C, we denote the outcomes corresponding to the latter by b a k ; b b k ; b t k , etc.
Suppose b k = i. Clearly, the algorithm will produce the same outcomes till step (k 1), and so j (C) = j ( b C) for all j 2 fb 1 ; : : : ; b k 2 g, and t k 1 = b t k 1 . Now, we calculate j (C) where j = b k 1 . As i is an extreme point of g N , and
The algorithm on C determines the cost allocation for i in step (k + 1). Since i is an extreme point of g N , i 6 = a s for any s. Hence, the choice of a j and b j must be the same in C and b C for j k + 1. So, for all j 2 fk + 1; : : :
Hence, we can conclude that satis…es Extreme Point Monotonicity.
Next, we will prove that only one rule over C 2 satis…es all three axioms. Let be a rule satisfying all the three axioms. We will show by induction on the cardinality of the set of nodes that is unique.
Let us start by showing that the result is true for jN j = 2. There are several cases. Hence, g f2;3g ( b
From Case 1 above,
From (13) and (14),
But, from EF,
By EPM, x 1 1 (C), and 2 ( C) 2 (C). Using EF, it follows that 1 (C) = c 01 and 2 (C) = c 12 . Hence, is unique. We again introduce a third agent (say 3). Consider the matrix C, coinciding with C on f1; 2g + , and such that Note that 3 is an extreme point of the m.c.s.t. corresponding to C. Using EPM, we get
Consider the reduced matrix C tr 
Note that c 12 + c 10 1 ( C) < c 12 + c 13 1 ( C) < c 10 + c 13 1 ( C)
. Also, EF on C gives,
Using EF on C we can conclude that, 1 (C) = c 12 and 2 (C) = c 10 , i.e. the allocation is unique.
The case c 10 > c 20 > c 12 is similar.
This completes the proof of the case jN j = 2. 15 Suppose the theorem is true for all C 2 C 2 N , where jN j < m. We will show that the result is true for all C 2 C 2 N such that jN j = m. Let C 2 C 2 N . Without loss of generality, assume c 10 = min k2N c k0 . 16 Thus (10) 2 g N (C). There are two possible cases.
Case 1: c 10 = min k2N + nf1g c 1k .
Case 2: c 1j = min k2N + nf1g c 1k .
Then from Lemma 1, (1j) 2 g N (C).
In either Case 1 or 2, let C denote the restriction of C on f1; jg. Then, from the case when #N = 2, it follows that 1 ( C) = min k2N + nf1g c 1k . Now, by iterative elimination of extreme points and repeated application of EPM, it follows that 1 (C) 1 ( C) = min k2N + nf1g c 1k . But, C 2 C 2 N , and satis…es EF, TR and EPM. So, from lemma 4, it follows that 1 (C) min k2N + nf1g c 1k . Hence, 1 (C) = min k2N + nf1g c 1k = x 1 (say). 1 5 Note that these three cases cover all possibilities since equality between di¤erent costs will result in the matrix not being in C 2 N . 1 6 This is unique as C 2 C We remove 1 to get reduced matrix C tr x 1 . From lemma 2, C tr x 1 2 C 2 . By TR,
From the induction hypothesis, the allocation is unique on C tr x 1 and hence on C. This completes the proof of the theorem.
We now show that the three axioms used in the theorem are independent.
Example 6: We construct a rule which satis…es EPM and TR but violates EF.
Since satis…es EPM, also satis…es EPM. Moreover, the restriction on the value of ensures that the o¤-diagonal elements in the reduced matrices are not positive. Hence, the reduced matrices always lie outside C. So, TR is vacuously satis…ed by . Also, since
To construct the next example we need to de…ne the concept of an m.c.s.t. partition.
where each g N k is the m.c.s.t. on N k for the matrix C restricted to
We will call such a partition the m.c.s.t. partition of N .
Example 7:
We now construct a rule which satis…es EF and TR, but does not satisfy EPM.
Let N = [N 1 ; : : : ; N T ] be the m.c.s.t. partition and #N t = n t . Let C t be the restriction of C over N + t . First, calculate separately for each C t . Consider any
EF is obviously satis…ed. If n t > 2, satis…es TR because satis…es TR. If Then, g N (C) = f(01); (12)g. Clearly, 2 is an extreme point of C. Let C be the restriction of C over {0,1}. Then, 1 (C) = 1 + M > 1 = 1 ( C) and hence EPM is violated.
We remark in the next theorem that the Bird rule B satis…es EF and EPM. Since Then, B 2 (C tr B 1 (C) ) = 0:5 and B 3 (C tr B 1 (C) ) = 1. Therefore TR is violated.
However, B does satisfy Source Consistency on the domain C 1 . In fact, we now show that B is the only rule satisfying EF, EPM and SR.
Theorem 3 : Over the domain C 1 , a rule satis…es SR, EF and EPM i¤ = B.
Proof : We …rst show that B satis…es all the three axioms. EF and EPM follow trivially from the de…nition. It is only necessary to show that B satis…es SR.
Let ( by C. From Lemma 3, C 2 C 1 . Also, the m.c.s.t. over N n f1g corresponding to C is
Also, for all i; j 2 N + n f1g, c ij = c ij if (ij) 2 g N (C), and for k 2 N n f1g; c k0 = c 1k
, where (k) is the immediate predecessor of k in g N nf1g . So, B k ( C) = B k (C) for all k 2 N n f1g and B satis…es Source Consistency.
Next, we show that B is the only rule over C 1 which satis…es all the three axioms.
This proof is by induction on the cardinality of the set of agents.
We remark that the proof for the case jN j = 2 is virtually identical to that of Theorem 2, with SR replacing TR and Lemma 5 replacing Lemma 4.
Suppose B is the only rule satisfying the three axioms, for all C 2 C 1 , where jN j < m. We will show that the result is true for all C 2 C 1 such that jN j = m.
Let C 2 C 1 . Without loss of generality, assume (10) 2 g N (C). There are two possible cases. But from EF, we know that
2 N , and hence the allocation is unique.
Case 2:
If there is only one extreme point of C, then g N (C) must be a line, i.e. each agent has at most one follower. Without loss of generality, assume 1 is connected to 2 and 0. Let C be the restriction of C over the set f0; 1; 2g: By iterative elimination of the extreme points and use of EPM we get i (C) i ( C). Using the induction hypothesis, we get 1 (C) c 10 and 2 (C) c 12 . We now show that the three axioms used in Theorem 3 are independent.
A rule which violates EF but satis…es SR and EPM can be constructed using example 6, being replaced by B.
The rule obtained by replacing with B in example 7, violates EPM but satis…es EF and SR. In Theorem 2, we have restricted attention to matrices in C 2 . This is because does not satisfy TR outside C 2 . The next example illustrates. Let g N nf1g = g 1 [ g 2 , where
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that 1 (C) = min k2N + nf1g c 1k .
So,
Now, extend g N nf1g to a connected graph g 0 N over N + as follows.
Claim: g 0 N is a connected graph over N + which is distinct from g N (C).
Proof of Claim:
It is su¢ cient to show that every i 2 N + n f1g is connected to 1 in g 0 N . Clearly, this is true for i = k . Take any i 2 N + n f1; k g. Let U (i; k ; g N nf1g ) = fm 0 ; m 1 ; : : : ; m p+1 g 17 where m 0 = i and m p+1 = k . If all these edges (m t m t+1 ) 8t p are in g 1 , then they are also in g 0 N , and there is nothing to prove.
So, suppose there is (m t m t+1 ) 2 g 2 while all edges in f(m 0 m 1 ); : : : ; (m t 1 m t )g belong to g 1 . In this case, (m t 1) as well as all edges in f(m 0 m 1 ); : : : ; (m t 1 m t )g belong to g 0 N . Hence, i is connected to 1.
. By assumption, g N nf1g and g N nf1g are di¤erent graphs. Then, there is some link (ij) in g N nf1g which is not present in g N nf1g . From the de…nitions of g N nf1g and C, (ij) is of the form (lk ) for some l 6 = 1. Let l be connected to some t in g N nf1g , where t 6 = 1; k . Note that c lk = c l1 . But,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that l; t 6 = k and so 1 (C) < min(c l1 ; c 1t ). But, then one can delete (lt) and add (lk ) in g N nf1g , which is not possible since it a m.c.s.t. of C. This contradiction establishes the claim.
To complete the proof of the lemma, note that
where g has been de…ned in the speci…cation of g 0
Finally, using (18),
But, this contradicts the assumption that g N (C) is the unique m.c.s.t. for C.
Proof : Throughout the proof of this lemma, we denote C sr 1 (C) by C. We know 1 (C) = c 01 . Suppose (ij) 2 g N (C) such that fi; jg \ f0; 1g = ;. Then
On the other hand if (i0) 2 g N (C), and i 6 = 1, then c 0i = minf(c i1 + c 10 1 (C)); c 0i g = min(c i1 ; c i0 ) = c i0 . Note that the last equality follows from the fact
Now we construct g N nf1g , a connected graph over N + n f1g as follows. Notice that j is an extreme point of C. Denoting ( C) = x, EPM implies that
We prove the lemma by showing that x i c im = c im .
Let C tr x i = C 0 , and N 0 = N n fig; (C 0 ) = x 0 . Assume x i < c im .
Case 1: C 0 2 C 2 N 0 . Suppose there is some k 2 N 0 such that (ik) 6 2 g N ( C). Let l be the predecessor of k in g N ( C). Since (kl) 2 g N ( C) and (ik) 6 2 g N ( C), c kl < c ki . Also, c il c im > x i . (ii) b c qp = min k2 N + b c qk .
(iii) c 0 pn > b c qn > max fs;t2U (p;n;g N ( C))j(st)2g N ( C)g c st . 19 (iv) b c qt is "su¢ ciently" large for all t 6 = p; n. . 20 This is because (pn) is now "irrelevant" since in the m.c.s.t. corresponding to e C, p and n will be connected through the path (pq) and (qn). To see this, note the following. The proof of Lemma 5 is almost identical to that of Lemma 4, and hence is omitted. 1 9 Note that this speci…cation of costs is valid because (26) is true. 2 0 This assertion is contingent on (pn); (kl) being the only pairs of nodes in some m.c.s.t. of C 0 having the same cost. However, the proof described here can be adapted to establish a similar conclusion if there are more such pairs.
